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Abstract: Following the work of Hannah Arendt, Michel Foucault, and Giorgio Agamben, this 
article offers a theoretical analysis of the relationship between modern forms of biopolitics and 
discourses of disability and able-bodiedness in the context of globalization.  
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 While recent scholarship emerging out of the field of disability studies has sought to 
globalize the study of disability, this article addresses a series of conceptual gaps in current 
theorizations about disability, globalization, and practices of empire.
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 A number of leading 
scholars in the field of disability studies have pointed out the analytical limits of applying a 
Western model of disability oppression to alternative contexts, but few have articulated the 
complex relationship between discourses of disability and able-bodiedness and contemporary 
forms of biopolitics.
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 By placing the work of Hannah Arendt (1958), Michel Foucault (1979), 
and Giorgio Agamben (1995) in conversation with disability studies scholarship, this article 
examines the process by which forms of citizenship become invested in and defined through the 
bodies of citizens. To globalize the study of disability, the field must first articulate the varied 
ways that conceptions of disability and able-bodiedness function discursively in the control, 
maintenance, and organization of national populations.  
 
Adapting the work of Jasbir Puar (2007) in Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in 
Queer Times, Robert McRuer (2010), David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder (2010), and Kristen 
Aherns (2010) have offered a significant element to the global analysis of disability by linking it 
directly to the biopolitical ends of empire (and its multiple valences, both national and global). 
According to McRuer (2010), Puar is able to demonstrate the varied ways that the “biopolitics of 
Empire now target certain lesbian and gay, and even ‘queer,’ subjects for life while 
simultaneously queering ‘terrorist corporealities’ and targeting them for death” (p. 169).  
 
Puar (2007) troubles the heterosexual/homosexual binary by showing how the state 
produces normative gay and lesbian identities in order to police more strictly alternative forms of 
queerness, consolidating ever-narrowing forms of white racial privilege in the process. Mitchell 
and Snyder (2010) coin the term “able-nationalism” in order to extend Puar’s analysis of gay and 
lesbian identities to disabled identities; they name the process by which some disabled subjects 
(“super-crips”) are nominated as exemplars of national values of progress in order to bolster an 





For Mitchell and Snyder (2010), “recent able-nationalisms” have managed to situate 
“some mutant bodies as effectively and normatively disabled,” allowing disabled people to 
“perform their representational work as a symbol of expansive neo-liberal inclusion efforts” (p. 
116). According to their analysis, the task of globalizing disability studies must also be the task 
of recognizing how some disabled subjects are made hyper-visible in order to render other 
disabled subjects invisible and beyond the bounds of neoliberal rationality.  
  The theoretical move initiated by these scholars begs a deeper consideration of the ways 
that the discursive logic of disability can often exceed the material state of the body and produce 
its own reality effects. In Lennard Davis’s (1995) foundational text, Enforcing Normalcy: 
Disability, Deafness, and the Body, he argues: 
 
“The problem, of course, is that the manner in which this society defines disability in fact 
creates the category. Able-bodied (or temporarily able-bodied) people safely wall off the 
severely disabled so that they cannot be seen as part of a continuum of physical 
differences, just as white culture isolates blackness as a skin color so as not to account for 
degrees of melanin production. How many people with hearing aids consider themselves 
deaf; how many people with knee braces consider themselves impaired?” (p. 7) 
 
 In light of Mitchell and Snyder’s (2010) analysis of the “able-disabled,” and, in addition, 
its inverse, the disabled able-bodied, it is not enough for disability studies to simply deconstruct 
the able-bodied/disabled binary in order to recognize disability along “a continuum of physical 
differences” that defines human variation in general. Instead, it is incumbent upon the field to 
consider more fully how the ideology of neoliberal inclusiveness and modern forms of 
biopolitics actually profit from the instability of previously fixed categories of identity and 
difference. As the recent work of McRuer (2006; 2010) and Mitchell and Snyder (2010) 
suggests, processes of globalization blur the lines between the able-bodied and disabled in some 
contexts while reconstituting them in both stricter and more subtle ways in others.  
 
To advance McRuer’s (2010) recent effort to think the “uneven biopolitical 
incorporation” of “disabled subjects who in certain times and places are made representative and 
‘targeted for life’ even as others are disabled in different ways, or cripped, or targeted for death” 
(p. 171), the field of disability studies must first develop a nuanced theoretical approach to the 
relationship between disability and the biopolitical imagination that has characterized the 
development of Western civilization and its liberal political tradition. In writing about 
contemporary forms of biopolitics, Giorgio Agamben (1995) argues that “only a politics that will 
have learned to take the fundamental biopolitical fracture of the West into account will be 
able…to put an end to the civil war that divides the peoples and the cities of the earth” (p. 180). 
Following McRuer, this article argues that the disabled/able-bodied binary informs the process 
by which the politics of life transforms into the politics of death, allowing for disability to act as 
the symbolic justification for the violence perpetuated by modern forms of empire.  
 
Discourses of Disability 
 
For the purposes of my argument, the phrase “discourse of disability” refers to a series of 
statements and writings that accrue over time and imbue a physical or mental difference with 
social meaning and value. Discourses are not simply representations, but representations that 
have achieved a general sense of approbation, to the point where they appear to articulate the 
world as it really is. Focusing on discourses of disability rather than disabilities themselves does 
not aim to deny the material reality of physical and mental difference, but only to suggest that 
physical and mental differences do not carry an innate value. In other words, disability only 
becomes a problem, a limit, or a disadvantage within a specific social context. Discourses of 
able-bodiedness operate in a similar fashion; one can only identify as an able-bodied subject 
within the institutional frameworks and through the cultural discourses that define able-
bodiedness and describe how the able-bodied should appear.  
 
Thinking in terms of discourses of disability helps open up critical space to theorize the 
gap between representations of disabilities and their physical manifestations. As so many 
disabled activists and scholars have noted, the experience of a disability is often far more 
influenced by cultural attitudes associated with disability than any physical consequences 
resulting from impairment. The gap between the personal experience of a disability and its larger 
cultural evaluation becomes even more complex when theorized in relationship to other 
categories of difference, such as race, class, gender, and sexuality. As Douglas Baynton (2001) 
explains, “disability has functioned historically to justify inequality for disabled people 
themselves, but it has also done so for women and minority groups” (p. 33). When the language 
of disability is used to describe an entire population of non-disabled people in order to justify 
their exclusion from full political membership in a society, discourses of disability lose their 
connection to the physical body entirely. Far from articulating the complexity of an embodied 
state, such discourses rely on the negative cultural associations of disability to stigmatize diverse 
groups of people and deny them basic human rights. The fact that so many Western nations have 
relied upon discourses of disability to produce exceptions to their laws only shows how deeply 




Disability Oppression in the West 
 
If discourses of disability have often been deployed historically to justify the social 
marginalization of all types of minority groups in the West, this tendency presents a conceptual 
problem for the field of disability studies. It asks scholars to consider why disability, in 
particular, is considered such a convenient and natural mark of social inferiority. The danger, of 
course, is to read disability oppression as an evolutionary phenomenon, the inevitable result of 
the human desire for reproductive fitness. Once disability oppression is linked to human biology, 
it is divested of its political implications.  
 
In contrast, when discourses of disability are examined in relationship to the biopolitical 
aims of the state, even the earliest forms of biopolitics help reveal the tacit political connection 
between disability and social oppression and exclusion. When Aristotle writes that “[human 
beings are] born with regard to life, but existing essentially with regard to the good life,” he 
articulates the ancient Greek distinction between natural life and political life (Agamben, 1995, 
p. 2). Hannah Arendt (1958) elaborates on this division in The Human Condition when she 
distinguishes between labor, work, and action, where labor, or the animal laborans, “corresponds 
to the biological process of the human body, whose spontaneous growth, metabolism, and 
eventual decay are bound to the vital necessities produced and fed into the life process by labor. 
The human condition of labor is life itself” (p. 7). According to Arendt, the ancient Greeks 
relegated labor to the private sphere of the home while privileging the political and public life of 
action. For Agamben (1995), this distinction corresponds to the privileging of bios—“the form or 
way of living proper to an individual or group”—over zoe—“the simple fact of living common to 
all living beings” (p. I).  
 
In the classical world, the physical needs of the body were excluded from the political 
realm. As Arendt (1958) explains, “what men [sic] share with all other forms of animal life was 
not considered to be human” (p. 84). In this way, citizenship referred to a process of 
disembodiment, where citizens were released from the strictures of the bodily labor associated 
with the home and free to concentrate on the higher intellectual aims of the polis. But in practice, 
disembodiment cannot be distinguished from able-bodiedness, since the minimum requirement 
for citizenship was really the ability to account for your basic needs autonomously in the private 
space of the home. The inability to account for the basic needs of the human body discretely and 
in private became a mark of subhuman status.  
 
Under this schema, disability was often interpreted as a visible sign of the body’s 
physical needs, allowing disability to become associated with zoe and able-bodiedness bios. The 
ancient Greek “conviction[s] that life without health [was] not worth living…and that suicide 
[was] a noble gesture to escape a life that has become burdensome” exemplify the way disabled 
subjects became devalued within ancient Greek society (Arendt, 1958, p. 315). For the ancient 
Greeks, a person burdened with ill health or severe impairment was incapable of experiencing an 
“autonomous and authentically human way of life” (Arendt, 1958, p. 13). Instead, the life of the 
free citizen acting in the sphere of the polis constituted the highest form of man’s being in the 
world, or Aristotle’s “good life.” 
 
The distinction between bios and zoe, or the good life and bare life, helps to explain the 
process by which disability gradually comes to mark the exception to the contemporary political 
order. By defining disability against citizenship, the ancient Greeks would set the stage for later 
discourses of disability deployed to deny diverse groups of people their citizenship rights in the 
West. The ancient Greeks’ privileging of bios over zoe reveals disability oppression to be a 
distinctly political process rather than a long evolutionary progression. The ancient Greeks 
elevated some aspects of human experience over others, privileging the human potential for 
intellect over the animal substratum that also made up part of human nature. In the process, 
disability came to mark a liminal zone separating human from animal, where disability 
represented something human that was refused acknowledgement as such. Only a perspective 
that understands the long history of disability oppression in the West as a distinctly political 
phenomenon will be able to recognize how discourses of disability and able-bodiedness have 
been translated by modern forms of biopolitics.  
 
Rethinking Foucault: Disability Studies and Biopolitics 
 
 If disability has historically marked the exception to the Western political order, then this 
provides a slight nuance to the interpretation that many disability studies scholars have offered 
for the relevance of biopolitics to the study of disability, particularly in relation to the work of 
Michel Foucault. While Foucault is often cited as an important predecessor to the still growing 
field of disability studies, too often disability studies scholars have sought to link Foucault’s 
docile body, produced by modern technologies of discipline, to the disabled body.
5
 Tobin 
Siebers’s (2008) discussion of Foucault in Disability Theory provides a primary example of this 
critical tendency. For Siebers (2008), Foucault’s docile body—“the body invented by the modern 
age”—is really just the disabled body in disguise (p. 58). Siebers dismisses Foucault’s 
poststructural account of the body as part of a larger argument that takes aim at social 
constructionist accounts of physical difference, suggesting that this type of analysis inevitably 
seeks to return to a healthier, fitter, and more natural version of the body that processes of 
signification have either blurred or substantially delimited. 
 
Siebers’s argument rests largely on a series of passages drawn from Foucault’s (1979) 
Discipline and Punishtwo of which are reprinted below: 
 
“The soldier was someone who could be recognized from afar; he bore certain signs: the 
natural signs of his strength and his courage, the marks, too, of his pride; his body was 
the blazon of his strength and valour.  
By the later eighteenth century the soldier has become something that can be made; out 
of a formless clay, an inapt body, the machine required can be constructed; posture is 
gradually corrected, a calculated constraint runs slowly through each part of the body, 
mastering it, making it pliable” (p. 57-58) 
 
The contrast presented by the depictions of the seventeenth and eighteenth century soldier 
provides compelling evidence for Siebers’s conclusion that Foucault’s work romanticizes the 
health and fitness of a previous age. As a representative of this earlier type of fitness, the first 
soldier stands erect, the natural emblem of an internal strength of mind and body that marks his 
calling. The second soldier, on the other hand, appears to lack this strong sense of physicality; 
while his body suggests a latent potential, it must be trained, sculpted, and adapted in order for 
that potential to be maximized. But Foucault (1979) is less concerned with the comparative 
physical merits of either soldier than the historical question of their verifiability as soldiers (p. 
135-136). In other words, Foucault is interested in what makes a soldier a soldier, and how that 
truth can be measured. In the first case, the soldier’s identity is verifiable through his physical 
attributes, traits gifted at birth, natural affinities for running, jumping, marching, and fighting.  
 
 For the second soldier, physical attributes are merely the raw material for a much more 
complex process of verification. This involves a training regimen and a series of drills and 
learned behaviors, but also an accounting process, a series of measurements, and a careful 
inventory of skills to ensure the effectiveness of that training. The problem with Siebers’s 
critique is the suggestion that, despite Foucault’s many claims to the contrary, his historical 
arguments are always implicitly evaluative, that he is nostalgic for a vision of the past.  
 
In Siebers’s (2008) argument, the docile body is the object of a profound form of 
repression, a reading that makes sense if “all of [Foucault’s] major writings are dedicated to 
tracking their [‘madness,’ ‘criminality,’ and ‘sexuality’] involvement with social repression and 
exclusion” (p. 57). But perhaps the most innovative aspect of Foucault’s work is the theoretical 
move he makes away from the traditional juridico-institutional approach to the problem of power 
in order to imagine a form of power that is not simply repressive but also productive. The 
concept of biopower allows Foucault to trace the many ways that power invests subjects at the 
level of the body, taking hold of all aspects of the life process. For Foucault, power is never 
simply a top-down affair; instead, it refers to a profoundly relational phenomenon. Even a 
cursory look at Foucault’s work reveals that “repression” and “exclusion” do not occupy 
privileged spaces in his lexicon.  
 
The fundamental difference between the two soldiers described above is that the second 
is the object of this new form of biopower. According to Foucault, the charge of biopower is to 
take hold of human life in all its aspects, “right down to the depths of society” (Foucault, 1979, 
p. 27). This type of power is invested in processes of economy and efficiency but also 
normalization; subjects begin to internalize the norms of the population to the point where they 
police themselves, suturing their identities around the larger biopolitical aims of the state.  
 
Foucault chooses to study the prison and the mental asylum because they are privileged 
sites from which to view the operation of power on the body of the subject, and it is significant to 
remember that the very idea of panopticism does not simply refer to Bentham’s ideal prison but 
rather the prison as the perfect functioning of a mode of discipline that has invested the 
population at large. If Foucault (1979) looks to sites of “exclusion” for his analysis, it is in an 
effort to shed light on the contemporary norm, and this is precisely what he means when he 
argues that he is writing a “history of the present” (p.31). 
 
 Siebers (2008) mistakenly associates the docile body with disability by over-investing in 
the spatial mechanics of Foucault’s analysis. The contrast presented in the two soldiers’ bodies 
does not distinguish between the able body and the disabled body, but rather, between types of 
able-bodiedness. The docile body is equivalent to the modern conception of the able body, where 
able-bodiedness names biopower’s functional end. This explains the shift in emphasis in the 
context of the prison and asylum from punishment and containment to rehabilitation—the object 
of biopower is the reintroduction of the normalized subject into society.  
 
 But the close relationship between biopower and able-bodiedness also suggests that able-
bodiedness refers not simply to a privileged form of identity but more immediately to a 
regulatory discourse. As a regulatory discourse, able-bodiedness does not name a form of 
repression, but a form of subjectification and control. As discourses of able-bodiedness invest the 
population around a series of measurable and increasingly differentiable norms, individual 
subjects begin to model their behavior according to normative expectations.  
 
 What Foucault’s work seems to intuit but never makes explicit is that the discourse of 
able-bodiedness, far from trying to eliminate the disabled body, requires it as a permanent threat 
and an imminent possibility for its very operation. In other words, disability and able-bodiedness 
name two sides of the same biopolitical coin, but this is a point that requires Agamben’s theory 
of sovereign power and bare life for further analysis. 
 
Disability and Modernity: A New Biopolitical Paradigm 
 
 Both Foucault and Arendt characterize modernity in precisely the same way, though they 
arrive at the conclusion separately: the threshold of modernity is constituted by the politicization 
of the unqualified body, simple human life. For Arendt (1958), scientific modernity names the 
process by which labor, the animal laborans, rises to central importance within the sphere of 
politics.  
 
 Foucault’s (1990) analysis concurs: “For millennia man [sic] remained what he [sic] was 
for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for political existence; modern man 
[sic] is an animal whose politics calls his [sic] existence as a living being into question” (p. 143). 
Once the animal laborans (or Agamben’s zoe) is linked to the disabled body, disability becomes 
stigmatized in the West as a symbol of the strictly biological needs of the human body.  
 
 The conclusion might follow that if the project of modern biopolitics is invested 
primarily in the biological processes of its subjects, disability would find a measure of inclusion 
in this new paradigm of rule. On the surface, this appears to be the case, particularly with the 
deinstitutionalization movement and legislation like the Americans with Disabilities Act (1990) 
that seeks to guarantee the civil rights of disabled populations. 
  
 Likewise, Davis (2002) has demonstrated the ways that disability finds inclusion as a 
market identity within the newly globalized economy. At the same time, there are dangers 
associated with this line of thought, which corresponds to a type of progress narrative associated 
with disability liberation. Even as the old walls of the institution begin to crumble, the group 
home, the nursing home, the special education classroom, and the government-funded facility 
continue to mark a point of separation between the able-bodied and the disabled.  
 
From a global perspective, the inclusion of disabled subjects is also severely limited. In 
Achilles Mbembe’s (2003) essay “Necropolitics,” he offers the concept of a “death-world” to 
describe “new and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to 
conditions of life conferring upon them the status of living dead” (p. 40).6 Given that there are 
more than a half billion disabled people in the world today and that 80 percent live in developing 
countries, the intersections between impaired bodies and the creation of death-worlds are 
multifarious (Davidson, 2008, p. 117).  
 
In such spaces, the visibly fragmented body marks a liminal position between life and 
death. While the social conditions conferred upon Mbembe’s (2003) “living dead” produce 
disproportionate numbers of disabled people, their disabilities perform the symbolic work of 
justifying those unequal living conditions.
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 The “death-world,” then, relies on a form of circular 
logic that inverts its temporal manifestation, where acts of violence are justified by the 
disabilities they produce.  
 
Neither Foucault nor Arendt can answer the competing and contradictory claims 
represented by the simultaneous inclusion and exclusion of the disabled body that characterizes 
modernity and the current age of global capital. For Agamben (1995), the primary limitation of 
Foucault’s (and by extension, Arendt’s) theoretical analysis is their inability to define the precise 
relationship between the law and specific forms of biopower (p.6). Agamben (1995) asks, 
“Where is the zone of indistinction (or, at least, the point of intersection) at which techniques of 
individualization and totalizing procedures converge?” (p. 6). In other words, at what point do 
sovereign acts of violence and modern technologies of discipline intersect and inform one 
another?  
 
Agamben (1995) answers this question with the concept of bare life, or the life of homo 
sacer, “who may be killed and yet not sacrificed” (p.8). 
 
The Disabled/Able-Bodied Binary and the Sovereign Decision over Life and Death 
  Bare life should be understood as both the foundation upon which the Western juridical 
order is erected and the object of biopower par excellence. According to Agamben (1995), 
sovereignty is constituted by the sovereign’s sole power to proclaim the state of exception, and 
the space of the exception is characterized by the production of bare life.
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 In other words, the 
“production of bare life is the originary activity of sovereignty” (p. 83).  
 
 Agamben continues, “the sovereign sphere is the sphere in which it is permitted to kill 
without committing homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice, and sacred life—that is, life 
that may be killed but not sacrificed—is the life that has been captured in this sphere” (p. 83). 
For Agamben, the originary activity of sovereignty is the production of excepted populations, or 
groups of people who are stripped of their political rights and can be murdered without 
consequence.  
 
Where Agamben parts ways from Foucault and Arendt is in the assumption that the 
inclusion of simple life—zoe or the animal laborans—in the political realm distinguishes the 
modern age from the classical world of the ancient Greeks. Instead, Agamben argues that the 
concept of zoe has always been included within the political world of the West by measure of its 
very exclusion. As he explains, “bare life remains included in politics in the form of the 
exception, that is, something that is included solely through an exclusion” (p. 11). 
  
For the ancient Greeks, zoe was relegated to the private sphere of the home while the 
qualified life of politics occupied the sphere of the polis. But in the effort to define the “good 
life” as the absence of bare life, bare life became fundamental to the very concept of Western 
politics—it was the included exclusion upon which the concept of political sovereignty became 
founded. The modern age of biopolitics does not, then, represent the first time that bare life has 
been included within the realm of politics in the West. Instead, as the state of exception becomes 
the rule,
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 or as the state of exception becomes the state’s working paradigm of government, the 
distinction between bios and zoe is no longer tenable: “exclusion and inclusion, outside and 
inside, bios and zoe, right and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction” (Agamben, 
1995, p. 9). 
 
 What Foucault and Arendt recognized as a new form of biopolitics was actually a 
qualitative shift in the politics of life, where the separation of bare life and political life could no 
longer be easily distinguished. According to the logic of my argument, as bare life and political 
life enter into a zone of indistinction, so too must the concepts of disability and able-bodiedness.  
 
 Just as Foucault (1979) conceived of his work as “a history of the present,” Agamben’s 
conception of bare life becomes most significant in relation to the contemporary paradigm of 
rule. As Slavoj Žižek (2010) explains:  
 
“The distinction between those who are included in the legal order and homo sacer is not 
simply horizontal, a distinction between two groups of people, but is increasingly also a 
“vertical” distinction between two (superimposed) ways in which the same people can be 
treated” (p. 25) 
 
 According to Žižek (2010), once exclusion and inclusion enter into “a zone irreducible 
indistinction,” the lines separating citizen from non-citizen also become ambiguous (Agamben, 
1995, p. 9). For this reason, Žižek (2010) argues that “the implication of [Agamben’s] analysis of 
homo sacer is not that we should fight for the inclusion of the excluded, but that homo sacer is 
the ‘truth’ of all of us” (p. 125).  
 
 To fight only for the inclusion of the excluded is to misunderstand the precarious position 
in which all human beings find themselves today, where anyone can become excluded from the 
rights of political membership at any time. At a basic level, “we are all ‘excluded’ in the sense 
that our most elementary, ‘zero’ position is that of being an object of biopolitics,” so that the 
rights of all citizens are always secondary to the biopolitical aims of the state (Žižek, 2010, p. 
125).  
 
Together, able-bodiedness and disability represent dueling yet complicit sides of the 
“zero” position to which Žižek (2010) speaks. Globalization presents not just a zone of 
indistinction but a zone of fluidity through which the disabled become able-bodied and the able-
bodied become disabled. Only this notion of a zone of indistinction makes sense of the fact that 
in the very name of the health of the body, modern biopolitics proliferates new forms of 
impairment and disease with ever finer gradations of symptoms, or the fact that so many “cures” 
produce their own ailments. And only this notion of a zone of fluidity can help to elucidate the 
point at which the disabled body becomes the site of the decision between value and nonvalue 




Globalization is not simply opposed to the nation-state—in fact, the forces of 
globalization often provide new spaces through which the state of exception can operate. The 
lesson that thinking of bare life in terms of disability provides is not that anyone can become 
disabled at any time—this is a lesson that the field of disability studies has long been aware of. 
Instead, the lesson is that anyone can be produced as a disabled subject at any time as the 
exception becomes the rule.  
 
Agamben illuminates the double register of bare life in order to bring into visibility the 
process by which the state of exception passes judgment on all our lives, but understanding bare 
life in relationship to disability adds an important affective register to his analysis. If Agamben 
seeks to articulate the biopolitical schism at which point biopolitics becomes thanatopolitics, the 
discursive distinction between the disabled body and the able body helps explain how subjects 
become invested in that schism without recognizing their precarious position within it.  
 
At the point of decision where the sovereign passes judgment on the bodies of the 
population, the disabled/able-bodied binary produces the evaluative logic which separates the 
body that must die from the body that is targeted for life. This is the point at which the able-
bodied subject can recognize the disabled subject only as an enemy—the disabled body becomes 
the static object of fear or pity while the able body masquerades as the precondition for the 
pursuit of happiness. If the end of biopolitics is the production of the able-bodied subject, then 
the end of thanatopolitics is the elimination of the disabled subject. The decision between life 
and death not only unites the able-bodied and disabled through their mutual exclusivity, it 
suggests that the knowledge of one cannot be produced outside of the knowledge of the other.  
 Hurricane Katrina and Memorial Medical Center 
 
The events that took place at Memorial Medical Center in New Orleans following 
Hurricane Katrina provide a material example of the largely theoretical analysis above. When 
doctors and nurses at Memorial decided to inject at least seventeen patients with lethal doses of 
drugs following Hurricane Katrina, they reduced their patients to the status of Agamben’s bare 
life, or homo sacer, “who may be killed and yet not sacrificed” (p. 8).  
 
As relief efforts were slow to arrive and the hospital lost power and running water, the 
medical professionals at Memorial decided to appraise their patient’s lives. The patients were 
divided into three groups: group 1 consisted of patients who could sit up and walk and they 
would be evacuated first; group 2 included sicker patients that required physical assistance in 
order to move; group 3 patients required significant assistance and were scheduled last for 
evacuation (Fink, 2009, p. 7).
11  
 
The patients at Memorial were separated according to the severity of their impairments, 
where the lives of the healthiest patients were prioritized above the lives of their sicker 
counterparts. In choosing to evacuate the healthiest patients first, the doctors at memorial acted 
upon the tacit assumption that the able-bodied have more to live for than the disabled.  
 
 The events at Memorial provide a powerful example of the theoretical claim that in the 
modern age, the disabled body becomes the site of the decision over life and death at which point 
biopolitics transforms into thanatopolitics. Before Katrina hit, LifeCare Hospitals of New 
Orleans leased Memorial’s seventh floor and catered to critically ill or injured patients (Fink, 
2009, p. 4). LifeCare, as Sheri Fink (2009) points out, was not a hospice—they specialized in 
rehabilitating “patients on ventilators until they could breathe on their own” (p. 5). Following the 
Hurricane, almost a third of LifeCare’s patients were given lethal combinations of drugs to ease 
their pain and hasten their deaths. In a 72-hour period, LifeCare’s whole raison d’être 
experienced a 180 degree shift—no longer concerned with the prolongation of life, the hospital’s 
staff turned their attention to the administration of death.  
 
If the floodwaters of Katrina forced the doctors and nurses at Memorial into a precarious 
situation, the specific choices they made to handle that situation relied upon longstanding 
cultural assumptions for their justification. When Memorial’s staff categorized all patients with 
“Do Not Resuscitate” orders as level “3’s” for evacuation, their decision had little to do with the 
extreme conditions produced by the disaster. In an interview with Fink, Bill Armington, a 
neuroradiologist at Memorial, explained, “patients who [did] not wish their lives to be prolonged 
by extraordinary measures wouldn’t want to be saved at the expense of others” (Fink, 2009, p. 4).  
 
Of course, a DNR order makes no such claim, only stating that a patient does not wish to 
be revived if his or her breathing or heartbeat stops. In deciding to euthanize many of their 
patients with DNR orders (and some without), the staff at Memorial chose not to consult them. 
This omission was particularly glaring in cases where patients were well aware of their 
surroundings and waiting anxiously for their evacuation.  
 
The actions of the doctors and nurses at Memorial exemplify Agamben’s (1995) 
conclusion that “the sovereign decision on bare life comes to be displaced from strictly political 
motivations and areas to a more ambiguous terrain in which the physician and the sovereign 
seem to exchange roles” (p. 143). But the “terrain” to which Agamben speaks is far more 
ambiguous still. When stories of the deaths at Memorial reached the press, an overwhelming 
majority of the public agreed with the decisions of Memorial’s staff. While the Orleans Parish 
assistant district attorney admitted that he and the district attorney “weren’t gung-ho” about 
prosecuting the doctors and nurses at Memorial, the public outcry against prosecution certainly 
impacted the New Orleans grand jury decision not to indict Anna Pou, a lead physician at 
Memorial, and two of her nurses, on second degree murder charges (Fink, 2009, p. 24). Through 
community rallies, letters to the district attorney, and talk radio calls, the citizens of New Orleans 
affirmed the sovereign acts of Memorial’s doctors and nurses—in the court of the public, they 
were viewed as heroes rather than murderers.  
 
The irony of this response is that the decision to euthanize patients reproduced the logic 
of exclusion that made New Orleans so vulnerable to Katrina in the first place. As early as 2004, 
the Philadelphia Inquirer had run a story about the Bush administration’s failure to reinforce the 
levees in New Orleans, explaining that the money had been “moved in the president’s budget to 
handle homeland security and the war in Iraq.”12 The US Government decided to take funds 
away from the support infrastructure of a largely poor, black, and disproportionately disabled 
population of US citizens.
13
 But if the Bush administration tacitly identified what type of person 
deserves protection in the US, their actions were mirrored by the doctors and nurses at Memorial 
who decided what type of person deserves to be saved during an emergency.  
 
The public response to the events at Memorial suggests the degree to which the sovereign 
decision on bare life becomes invested in the population itself, where the citizen begins to 
assume the role of the sovereign. In other words, the citizen is asked to render the decision on 
bare life even as he or she occupies the “zero-level” position that it names. The fantasy induced 
by processes of globalization and recent able-nationalisms occludes the fact that able-bodiedness 
and disability structure the biopolitical imaginary, allowing able-bodied citizens to imagine 
themselves as altogether different from the disabled at precisely the moment where a decision 
must be made.  
 
Only from this position of absolute difference can the able-bodied pass sentence on the 
disabled without recognizing their own fate on the faces of those they condemn. It might at first 
seem like an exaggeration to link the institution, the group home, and the nursing home to 
Agamben’s discussion of the camp, but they all represent permanent spatial locations where the 
fact of “whether or not atrocities are committed depends not on law but on the civility and ethical 
sense” of care workers (Agamben, 1995, p. 174).  
 
Where else is the citizen’s sovereignty over the question of bare life more commonly 
recognized than in the child’s reluctant decision to overturn their parents’ wishes and remove 
them to the nursing home, a place where care workers are underpaid and abuse goes largely 
unchecked? The spatial locations of separation that constitute many disabled peoples’ lives are 
not unrelated to the emergence of the new spaces of exception presented by refugee camps, 
detention centers, disaster areas, and terrorist holding cells. In fact, these permanent spaces of 
exclusion are ideological anchor points by which the exception gradually becomes accepted as 
the rule.  
 
     Conclusion 
 
The disabled/able-bodied binary has become more mobile in the contemporary moment, 
where the state, along with its capitalist infrastructure, draws on disability rights discourses and 
inclusion efforts in order to furnish an image of multicultural benevolence and render invisible 
the processes by which it disables other populations in alternative contexts. If discourses of 
disability have gradually come to legitimate the state of exception, the logic of sovereignty has 
begun to inform the decisions of the population at large, particularly at times of personal or 
communal crisis.  
 
Where Agamben’s analysis falls short is in its inability to adequately theorize the social 
stratifications that make some groups of people far more vulnerable to sovereign practices of 
violence than others. The process by which the able-bodied become disabled discursively is often 
inflected by other categories of difference, including race, gender, sexuality, and particularly, 
class. Agamben (1995) writes that: 
 
“Until a completely new politics—that is, a politics no longer founded on the exceptio of 
bare life—is at hand, every theory and every praxis will remain imprisoned and 
immobile, and the “beautiful day” of life will be given citizenship only either through 
blood and death or in the perfect senselessness to which the society of the spectacle 
condemns it” (p. 11) 
 
 Recognizing able-bodiedness and disability as twin sides of the biopolitical imagination 
can contribute to the new politics to which Agamben gestures by denaturalizing the logic of 
ability that informs modern processes of exclusion and extermination. Such a project can help 
recast questions of human agency and ethics away from the discourse of human rights and its 
close alliance with neoliberal ideology to consider much more deeply our shared vulnerabilities 
as a human community.  
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In their introduction to The Global Transformations Reader, David Held and Anthony McGrew 
(2003) provide a clear and concise definition of globalization: “Simply put, globalization denotes 
the expanding scale,growing magnitude, speeding up and deepening impact of interregional 
flows and patterns of social interaction. It refers to a shift or transformation in the scale of human 
social organization that links distant communities and expands the reach of power relations 
across the world’s major regions and continents” (p. 4). By defining globalization around a series 
of descriptive terms that primarily denote a quantitative change in scale, Held and McGrew 
suggest that while interregional flows and patterns of social interaction are not new, they have 
never been so dominant in the structuring of a truly global economy.  
2 
See recent scholarship by Ato Quayson (2007), Lennard Davis (2002), Michael Davidson 
(2008), Robert McRuer (2006), David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder (2010), Anita Ghai (2002), 
and Nirmala Erevelles (2010), among others, which has sought to extend the parameters of 
disability studies analysis beyond its traditionally Euro-American context.  
3Neoliberalism is not meant as a synonym for globalization. As McRuer (2006) explains, “Above 
all, through the appropriation and containment of the unrestricted flow of ideas, freedoms, and 
energies unleashed by the new social movements, neoliberalism favors and implements the 
unrestricted flow of corporate capital. International financial institutions (IFIs) and neoliberal 
states thus work toward the privatization of public services, the deregulation of trade barriers and 
other restrictions on investment and development, and the downsizing or elimination (or, more 
insidiously, the transformation into target markets) of vibrant public and democratic cultures that 
might constrain or limit the interests of global capital. These cultural shifts have inaugurated an 
era that, paradoxically, is characterized by more global inequality and raw exploitation and less 
rigidity in terms of how oppression is reproduced (and extended)” (p. 2-3). For the purposes of 
this article, neoliberalism names the dominant ideology underlying current processes of 
globalization 
4
Examples of such practices abound throughout American and European history, particularly in 
relation to projects of colonialism. Perhaps the most heinous example of disability being used to 
signify various forms of abjection occurred during the Nazi final solution. As Zygmaunt Bauman 
(1989) explains, “It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to arrive at the idea of extermination of a 
whole people without race imagery; that is, without a vision of endemic and fatal defect which is 
in principle incurable and, in addition, is capable of self-propagation unless checked” (p. 73). 
Bauman demonstrates that the type of racism responsible for the holocaust necessarily rested on 
the logic of disability (a “fatal” and “incurable” “defect”) for its explanatory power.  
5
See Tremain (2005) for a diverse range of Foucauldian interpretations of disability and able-
bodiedness.
 6Necropolitics, and Agamben’s thanatopolitics, refer to the politics of death. Both 
terms suggest the sovereign’s right to rule over the life and death of the population. When 
Agamben (1995) speaks of the “fundamental biopolitical fracture of the West,” he names the 
point at which the politics of life transforms into the politics of death (p. 180).  
7
 Mbembe (2003) writes, “In other cases, in which physical amputation replaces immediate 
death, cutting off limbs opens the way to the deployment of techniques of incision, ablation, and 
excision that also have bones as their target. The traces of this demiurgic surgery persist for a 
long time, in the form of human shapes that are alive, to be sure, but whose bodily integrity has 
been replaced by pieces, fragments, folds, even immense wounds that are difficult to close. Their 
function is to keep before the eyes of the victim—and of the people around him or her—the 
morbid spectacle of severing (p. 35). We can add to this Davidson’s (2008) point that “There are 
more than one-hundred-ten million land mines in sixty-four countries. There are one and a half 
mines per person in Angola, where one-hundred-twenty people per month become amputees. 
There are twelve million land mines in Afghanistan, one for every two people. It seems hardly 
necessary to add that land mines are created not to kill but to disable, thereby maximizing the 
impact of bodily damage on the extended family and community” (p. 117). 
 8
 The state of exception refers to the sovereign’s right to suspend the law in a time of crisis.  
 9The Bush homeland security state offers a paradigmatic example of Agamben’s state of 
exception. Measures like the Patriot Act suspended the individual rights of citizens indefinitely 
in the interests of national security. According to Agamben, as the state of exception becomes a 
working paradigm of government, the rights of all citizens become vulnerable.  
10The theoretical concept of a “zone of fluidity” recalls my earlier discussion of the way 
discourses of disability are often deployed to justify various forms of political exclusion in the 
West. As neoliberal inclusion efforts and processes of globalization blur the lines between the 
disabled and able-bodied in some contexts, transitions between able-bodied and disabled 
identities are sped up in other contexts. The “zone of fluidity” defines the ambiguous terrain 
where the previously able-bodied can become coded as disabled and the previously disabled can 
become “normatively” disabled, or represented as “able-bodied” by measure of their inclusion 
within the global economy. All of these shifts are made in relation to other forms of difference, 
including race, gender, class, and sexuality.  
 
11
 For this section, I am indebted to Sheri Fink’s (2009) New York Times piece, “The Deadly 
Choices at Memorial.”  
12
Quoted in Dyson, 2007, p. 81. 
13In their essay, “Natural Hazards, Human Vulnerability, and Disabling Societies: A Disaster for 
Disabled People,” Laura Hemingway and Mark Priestley (2006) cite that “in 2000 more than 
20%” of the population “were recorded as disabled in New Orleans, St Bernard, Jefferson, 
Hancock, and Jackson” (59).  
 
